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Abstract: This article interrogates the increasing role of faith groups in the delivery 
of public services in England pursuant to the Big Society agenda. Specifically, it 
examines the potential impact on competing values such as equality between citizens. 
After a historical survey of the role of faith communities, the article reviews an 
example of protracted litigation in which the clash between faith based service 
provision and equality was at the forefront. It then adopts a comparative approach, 
turning to the extensive American experience of Charitable Choice. Finally, the issues 
are situated within a broader theoretical frame. The author concludes with 
recommendations for policymakers in what will likely be a field of growing 
importance. 
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The delivery of public services in England today is in a state of change and, some 
would argue, crisis. Government austerity has resulted in the scaling back of what 
were perceived by many to be core services, the receipt of which were thought to be 
central elements of modern citizenship. Closely related to the cutbacks are ongoing 
changes to the mode of delivery. Increasingly, the state has shifted its role from 
provider of services to an intermediary located between the citizen and a range of 
actors from both the profit and non-profit sectors. This phenomenon is growing in 
importance and has been harnessed to an ideological commitment to the Big Society 
agenda of the current Coalition Government.1 
 
 This article focuses on a particular element in this policy matrix—faith 
communities—when the state empowers them to provide services. This development 
challenges the public/private divide in the liberal polity and raises broader questions 
                                                 
1
  See Pete Alcock, ‘Building the Big Society: A New Policy Environment for the Third Sector 
in England’ (2010) 1 Voluntary Sector Review 379; Sheila Furness and Philip Gilligan, ‘Faith-based 
Organisations and UK Welfare Services: Exploring Some Ongoing Dilemmas’ (2012) 11 Social Policy 
and Society 601; Steven Kettell, ‘Thematic Review: Religion and the Big Society: A Match Made in 
Heaven?’ (2012) 40 Policy & Politics 281; Debra Morris, ‘Charities and the Big Society: A Doomed 
Coalition?’ (2012) 32 Legal Studies 132. No less important (and at least as controversial) is the rapidly 
expanding role of the private for profit sector; see Daniel Boffey, ‘The care workers left behind as 
private equity targets the NHS’ The Guardian (London, 9 August 2014), available at 
www.theguardian.com/society/2014/aug/09/care-workers-private-equity-targets-the-nhs (accessed 20 
August 2014). Faith based organizations also have a long history of involvement in the international 
development movement; see Gerard Clarke, ‘Faith Matters: Faith-based Organisations, Civil Society 
and International Development’ (2006) 18 Journal of International Development 835. 
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concerning pluralism and diversity in a society committed to liberal norms of 
equality. I interrogate why faith groups are thought to be well suited to a public role. 
The article examines the impact, not only on the citizen ‘consumer’ of services but 
also for the faith ‘provider’, which may find itself increasingly embraced by the state 
in a new relationship not of its choosing. 
 This investigation is timely given the current political climate. The influence 
of the church on public policy is, of course, central to English constitutional history. 
But my focus is on recent developments which became apparent under the Labour 
Government beginning in 1997.2  Change has accelerated and been somewhat 
redefined under the Coalition’s Big Society theme.3 Faith communities have a new 
found importance as key civil society players in the Government’s agenda which 
centres on localism, devolution of power, citizen choice, and community based 
service delivery.4 The Government has repeatedly emphasized that people of faith are 
                                                 
2
  Adam Dinham, Faiths, Public Policy and Civil Society (Palgrave Macmillan 2009); Rob 
Macmillan, ‘The Third Sector Delivering Public Services: An Evidence Review’ (2010) Third Sector 
Research Centre Working Papers, available at 
www.birmingham.ac.uk/generic/tsrc/documents/tsrc/working-papers/working-paper-20.pdf (accessed 
20 August 2014). 
3
  Kettell (n.1). 
4
  Jesse Norman, The Big Society: The Anatomy of the New Politics (University of Buckingham 
Press 2010). Whether the Big Society has proven successful is increasingly open to debate, as large 
private firms may have benefited more than community based initiatives; see Patrick Butler, ‘Big 
society policy not suited for deprived communities, says thinktank’ The Guardian (London, 9 
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valued by the state. In this way, the Government (or at least the Conservative Party 
section of the Coalition) attempts an ideological break from what it describes as the 
dominance of secularism under which the state was assumed to have a monopoly on 
both answers to intractable social problems and the delivery of solutions.5  
 The article begins with a historical overview of faith communities and public 
service delivery. This is inevitably bound up with the role of charity and the rise (and 
retrenchment) of the welfare state. Turning to the legal domain, I explore a protracted 
example of litigation directly involving faith and equality. The article then adopts a 
comparative approach focusing on the United States. In the US, faith based social 
services have become significant in recent years, leading to wide ranging debate about 
how this new pluralism in service provision can be reconciled with the separation of 
church and state. Although the American constitutional context is unique, the analysis 
nevertheless is informative beyond the US. Finally, I situate the issues theoretically 
and conclude with some provisional answers as to how the state might best engage 
with faith. 
                                                                                                                                            
December 2013), available at www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/dec/09/big-society-deprived-david-
cameron-charitable-wealthy (accessed 20 August 2014). 
5
  Baroness Warsi, ‘We stand side by side with the Pope in fighting for faith’ The Telegraph 
(London, 13 February 2012), available at www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/9080441/We-stand-side-
by-side-with-the-Pope-in-fighting-for-faith.html (accessed 20 August 2014). Warsi, the first Muslim to 
sit in the cabinet, resigned her positions as Minister of State at the Foreign Office and Minister for 
Faith and Communities on 5 August 2014 in protest over Government policy on Gaza.  
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II.  From Welfare State to Big Society: Historical Overview 
Faith groups are far from being new actors in service delivery. In fact, there is a long 
and important history of charitable provision in relation to education, hospitals, and 
support for the unemployed, disabled, widowed and orphaned. Victorian England ‘has 
been seen as a golden age for faith-based social action’.6 This included an early form 
of partnership with government, which can be found in the ‘nineteenth-century 
practice of charities caring for delinquent and neglected children in return for payment 
by the state’.7  
The growing acceptance of the inadequacies and unevenness of charitable 
responsibility for social services, combined with professionalization of key players 
such as social workers, led to the development of the welfare state. After 1945, that 
process accelerated, and ‘the idealism of universal welfare was too strong an 
influence for a disparate non-governmental matrix of service provision to elude’.8 
Paradoxically, during the same period, ‘the post-war welfare state heralded a growth, 
                                                 
6
  Dinham (n.2), 122. 
7
  Debra Morris, ‘Paying the Piper: The 'Contract Culture' as Dependency Culture for 
Charities?' in Alison Dunn (ed), The Voluntary Sector, the State and the Law (Hart 2000) 123, 124-125. 
8
  Dinham (n.2), 123. 
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not a decline, in charitable formation’.9 Over time, Adam Dinham argues, a 
realization emerged that the idealism of a top-down driven welfare state had not 
resulted in the eradication of social problems. This gave rise in the 1970s to ‘renewed 
enthusiasm for community-based policies rooted in neighbourhood and self-help’, 
which opened the door again to faith groups.10  
 A major turning point came with the Thatcherite revolution in the 1980s. 
Conservative policy aimed at shrinking the state saw ‘core state functions’ shifted 
towards a broad range of actors, ‘be they public/private or the voluntary and 
community sector’.11 The value of faith groups was their perceived ability to provide 
services. They were also thought to possess a uniquely valuable ‘moral or ethical 
ethos’ combined with potential for innovation.12  
 Consequently, the state's role altered from the provider to the contractor for 
services on behalf of the citizen. This gave rise to a ‘contract culture’ in which the 
charitable sector as a whole became dependent on the award of contracts.13 Through 
the 1990s, the shift continued and charities were increasingly reliant on government, 
                                                 
9
  Ibid. 
10
  Ibid., 124. 
11
  Alison Dunn, ‘Demanding Service or Servicing Demand? Charities, Regulation and the 
Policy Process’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 247, 249. 
12
  Dinham (n.2), 120. 
13
  Morris (n.7). 
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sometimes leading to ‘mission drift’ towards service provision.14 This also meant that 
charities were bound by a regulatory structure which was perceived to demand 
‘effectiveness and efficiency at every turn’.15 However, the process of contracting out, 
which importantly also included the for profit sector, led to much publicized concerns 
regarding quality control, since the award of contracts was based on price.16  
 The New Labour period saw ‘a much more rapid outsourcing of services from 
the state’.17 There were also ideological shifts. The Government introduced ‘best 
value’ in tendering, which was intended to ensure ‘that the best, not the cheapest, 
would win contracts’.18 As well, the Voluntary Sector Compact was designed to 
‘redress the asymmetry of power between funder and provider’.19 It enhanced the role 
of non-state actors in decisions surrounding the commissioning of services. Social 
enterprise was featured in the Government’s agenda to encourage ‘greater self-
sufficiency of service providers’.20 An Office of the Third Sector was created within 
the Cabinet Office in 2006 to coordinate work across government. 
                                                 
14
  Ibid., 129. 
15
  Dinham (n.2), 126. 
16
  Ibid. 
17
  Macmillan (n.2), 6. 
18
  Dinham (n.2), 126. 
19
  Ibid. 
20
  Dinham (n.2), 127. 
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 With respect to legal developments, new charities legislation provided an 
expansive definition of ‘charitable purpose’, with explicit mention of citizenship. This 
helps to ensure that charities do not run afoul of the law of charities when embarking 
upon service delivery.21 
 
 
 The impact of change is demonstrated by the volume of activity and the 
overall dependence of the charitable sector on the state. In terms of funding, ‘by 2008, 
around 36% of total income for charities in England and Wales, just under £13 billion, 
was coming from statutory sources’.22 Of no less importance is the shift in the nature 
of state funding: ‘the total amount of finance represented by contracts has increased 
(from £4.7 bn in 2003/04 to £9.1 bn in 2007/08), whilst the total amount represented 
by grants has fallen (from £5.0 bn in 2003/04 to £3.7 bn in 2007/08)’.23 These 
developments led some critics—including those within the Conservative Party—to 
question the instrumental way in which the sector was viewed by the Labour 
Government. They argued that charities were being 'co-opted as part of a “shadow 
                                                 
21
  Charities Act 2011, s 3(1)(e). 
22
  Morris (n.1), 135. 
23
  Macmillan (n.2), 12. 
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state”' in a relationship of dependency, increased bureaucracy, professionalization, 
lack of agency, and agenda distortion.24  
 Faith groups found themselves well placed to deliver on the ‘mixed economy 
of welfare’, and this was certainly recognized within government.25 Labour took steps 
to embrace faith based communities within the policy making process. In 2003, the 
Faith Community Liaison Group ‘was created to instil their views across the civil 
service and chaired by the Home Office minister responsible for “civil renewal” 
within a wide remit’.26 The expansion of state funded religious schools also 
characterized the Blair years. Stephen Hunt argues that this led to the anomalous 
situation in which the same government that was extending equality rights to lesbians 
and gay men (in opposition to some faith communities) was ‘courting’ faith groups. 
But this should come as no great surprise.27 The Labour Party contains a strong 
current of what John Annette refers to as ‘Christian communitarianism’, in which 
faith has an important role in civic engagement.28 This manifests itself in ‘a distinctive 
view of civic religion that sees religion as contributing to the creation of a more 
                                                 
24
  Ibid., 8. 
25
  Dinham (n.2), 125. 
26
  Stephen Hunt, 'A Turn to the Rights: UK Conservative Christian Lobby Groups and the “Gay 
Debate”' (2011) 6 Religion and Human Rights 291, 297. 
27
  Ibid., 297-298. 
28
  John Annette, ‘Faith Communities, Communitarianism, Social Capital and Youth Civic 
Engagement’ (2011) 11 Ethnicities 383, 384. 
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dynamic civil society and the development of a more democratic political culture’, but 
in which government also plays a central role (which differentiates it from neo-liberal 
understandings of the state).29 As a consequence, the Labour administration is best 
characterized both in terms of continuity but also as having a distinctive 
understanding of faith groups grounded in its history and philosophy. Most 
importantly for the purposes of this article, the Labour years created the conditions for 
a re-articulation of the philosophical basis of the role of faith communities through the 
Conservative vision of the Big Society.  
 The Big Society is one of the key policy initiatives of David Cameron’s 
leadership of the Conservative Party. It is also one of its most derided.30 In short, it 
centres on the empowerment of communities and individuals and, in policy terms, the 
Big Society focuses on localism, volunteerism, support for the charitable sector, the 
transfer of power away from central government, and the fostering of individual 
choice. It was included in the Coalition Agreement for Government and is overseen 
by the Office of Civil Society within the Cabinet Office.  
                                                 
29
  Ibid. 
30
  See generally Alcock (n.1); Norman (n.4); Kettell (n.1); Morris (n.1). Prime Minister David 
Cameron's own faith would appear to have strengthened recently, having now declared himself as 
‘evangelical’ about his Christianity; see Anne Perkins, ‘David Cameron 'does God' and puts faith on 
the table’ The Guardian (London, 18 April 2014) available at 
www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/apr/18/david-cameron-god-faith (accessed 20 August 2014). 
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 Its philosophical basis was developed by Jesse Norman, who describes the key 
themes as ‘social action, public service reforms and community empowerment, 
devolution of power to local government, and encouragement of cooperatives and 
mutuals’.31 The Big Society is intended as a corrective to a view of the state (which is 
attributed to the Labour Party) as transmitter of values to the citizen, ‘as though a 
sense of community could only be achieved through shared dependence on the 
state’.32 By contrast, the Big Society is characterized by a diffusion of power and ‘a 
three-way relationship between individuals, institutions and the state. It is when this 
relationship is functioning well that societies flourish’.33  
 This relationship has been analogized to a coral reef, ‘where the co-existence 
of the sea-bed (basic state services), the coral growths (social and private enterprises) 
and the fish (citizens and communities, swimming around, feeding on these) is 
presented as a metaphor for the Big Society’.34 The metaphor, however, is not entirely 
compelling. The fish are not only consumers but also—when they group together as 
communities—active participants in the formation of the coral growth. Furthermore, 
                                                 
31
  Norman (n.4), 196-197. 
32
  Ibid., 31. 
33
  Ibid., 165. 
34
  Alcock (n.1), 383. 
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the distinction between sea-bed and coral growth is increasingly blurred, as the 
definition of basic state services becomes contested.  
 Faith communities have been a core component of Big Society thinking. The 
Government has stressed the importance of faith-based providers of public services 
and their crucial position in the Big Society agenda. Faith groups are held up as the 
emblematic example of the Big Society in practice.35 But Conservative support for 
faith is based upon more than the instrumental capacity to deliver services. The 
Government also has sought to construct itself as the defender of faiths as distinct 
from the alternative (Labour) hostility and intolerance towards religion.  
 This position has been most vehemently articulated by Baroness Warsi who 
argues, echoing arguments that have been made particularly strongly by evangelical 
Christian groups in defence of religious freedom, that religion has been unfairly 
relegated to the private sphere.36 This is blamed on ‘militant secularisation’37 and 
‘secular fundamentalists’.38 It is attributed (inaccurately, I would suggest) to the 
previous Labour Government. Bringing religion back – unapologetically – into the 
                                                 
35
  Kettell (n.1); Morris (n.1). 
36
  See Baroness Warsi, ‘Britain must be a country where people can be proud of their religion’ 
The Telegraph (London, 28 October 2011) available at 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/8853108/Britain-must-be-a-country-where-people-can-be-proud-
of-their-religion.html  (accessed 20 August 2014); Warsi (n.5). 
37
  Warsi (n.5). 
38
  Warsi (n.36). 
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public sphere will enable faith communities to play their full part in the Big Society. 
Warsi argues that the impact will be substantial because ‘religious people contribute 
more to society than the non-religious’.39 Faith gives rise to a charitable mindset and a 
less atomistic and passive view of citizenship, which are conditions for a flourishing 
Big Society.  
This discourse is connected to somewhat contradictory claims about 
citizenship and identity. First, it is unclear whether faith produces active citizenship or 
whether what is really of value is Christianity. While Baroness Warsi is careful to 
emphasize that ‘all the major religions ask their followers to stand up for their 
neighbours’, she simultaneously asserts the Christian heritage of Britain (and Europe): 
‘I will be arguing for Europe to become more confident and more comfortable in its 
Christianity. The point is this: the societies we live in, the cultures we have created, 
the values we hold and the things we fight for all stem from centuries of discussion, 
dissent and belief in Christianity’.40 Secularism has attempted to deny these ‘facts’.  
The other contradiction within Conservativism concerns the role of rights 
discourse. The Big Society, in part, is designed to remedy a growing atomization of 
society, which is closely connected to the exponential growth of human rights. The 
                                                 
39
  Ibid. 
40
  Warsi (n.5). 
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claims of minorities to rights—supported by sympathetic secularists—have led to the 
‘closeting’ of religion so as not to offend sensibilities. Consequently, the good that 
could be performed by those of faith in the public sphere is lost because of their 
relegation to the private by a secularism that ‘demonstrates similar traits to totalitarian 
regimes’.41 By unshackling faith groups, society will be enriched by acts of 
citizenship which will nourish the Big Society. Of course, what is ignored in this 
narrative is the readiness of individuals of faith to turn to human rights in defense of 
their presence in the public sphere.42  
In sum, the Labour Government recognized the instrumental usefulness of 
faith groups both to the delivery of services and in advancing a Christian 
communitarian ethos (and perhaps a multicultural public sphere). Conservative 
support of faith communities is different. Faith communities—like other civil society 
actors—are to be freed from a servile relationship to the state. They are not only 
particularly well placed to deliver services. Their very ethos (or perhaps more 
accurately that of Christianity) makes their members ideal active citizens. This will 
lead to diversity and innovation in service delivery and, although this is not explicit, it 
is particularly useful in an age of state austerity. As well, this policy reverses anti-
                                                 
41
  Ibid. 
42
  Hunt (n.25), 297. 
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religious prejudice against faith based groups. Such prejudice is grounded in fears that 
service delivery is a cover for the promotion of religion; that service delivery will 
favour those of the same faith; and that the method of service delivery will be 
informed by religious beliefs.43 Within Big Society rhetoric, these fears are seen as 
misplaced and are designed to undermine the results which faith communities can 
achieve. The job of government is to facilitate civil society actors—such as faith 
communities—rather than to stand in their way.  
The Government’s strategy was stated clearly in the Open Public Services 
White Paper: ‘Wherever possible, we will increase choice by giving people direct 
control over the services they use. And where it is not possible to give people direct 
control, elected representatives should also have more choice about who provides 
services and how’.44 This aim is to be advanced along three axes: individual services, 
neighbourhood services, and commissioned services. First, if feasible, individual 
service users should be provided with choice as to their service providers. The 
                                                 
43
  Hannah Furness, 'Faith groups “prevented from doing vital community work by anti-religious 
prejudice”' The Telegraph (London, 20 March 2012) available at 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/9156381/Faith-groups-prevented-from-doing-vital-community-
work-by-anti-religious-prejudice.html (accessed 20 August 2014). 
44
  Section 1.12. The White Paper, which sets out the Government's vision for public service 
reform, is available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/255288/OpenPublicServ
ices-WhitePaper.pdf (accessed 20 August 2014). 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
empowerment of individuals is designed to enhance competition and improve the 
quality of services. It is delivered through a range of mechanisms: ‘direct cash 
payments to individuals, personal budgets, vouchers, tariff payments, loans and 
entitlements’.45 This is becoming an increasingly important (and controversial) feature 
of adult care provision, education, child and family services, health, and social 
housing.46 Individual choice helps justify a role for a wide range of faith based and 
other charitable (as well as for profit) providers of services. The individual has the 
ability—if there is genuine choice and adequate information—to find the service most 
suited to her needs, outlook and orientation.   
 Second, the Government supports neighbourhood services when they are used 
collectively. Greater community input and control is promoted, particularly through 
the provisions of the Localism Act, which introduced the community right to buy, 
community right to build, community right to buy assets of value, and the community 
right to challenge.47 For example, the right to challenge is intended to lead to greater 
diversity: ‘the right enables voluntary and community bodies, parish councils and 
local authority employees to express an interest in running a local authority service, 
                                                 
45
  Ibid., Section 3.2. 
46
  Ibid., Section 3.3. 
47
  Ibid., Section 4.2. 
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which may trigger a procurement exercise for the service’.48 It has been argued that 
faith based community groups are well positioned to take advantage of this right 
(although the evidence of this is patchy). Should they then be awarded the right to 
provide the service, some fear that delivery could be shaped by religious doctrine and 
ethos.49 This is a central issue of this article, to which I will return.  
 The third policy which furthers open public services is commissioning by 
central and local government. Here again, the Open Public Services White Paper 
focuses on devolution, innovation, diversity, and payment by results: 'the principles of 
open public services will switch the default from one where the state provides the 
service itself to one where the state commissions the service from a range of diverse 
providers … [I]t encourages new, innovative providers to compete for contracts, 
allows payment by results and/or incentives for supporting particular social groups to 
be built into contracts, and enables the disaggregation of services into specialist 
functions'.50 
 
                                                 
48
  National Association for Voluntary and Community Action (NAVCA), The Localism Bill 
available at www.navca.org.uk/existing/NR/rdonlyres/f1a19ea0-f410-401c-a386-
a374aa8e5aa6/0/localismbillmpsbriefing.pdf (accessed 20 August 2014). 
49
  Kettell (n.1), 291. 
50
  Section 5.2. 
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 As well, the Government has sought to enhance the ability of social 
enterprises to engage in procurement exercises through the Public Services (Social 
Value) Act 2012, under which the ‘social value’ element has been made explicit in 
procurement decisions by local authorities. This is designed to strengthen the position 
of social enterprises when engaged in the bidding process.  
 Local authorities in England have been experimenting with the commissioning 
of services. For example, ‘co-operative commissioning’ in the London Borough of 
Lambeth is based on a partnership model between the Authority and local people in 
determining the most appropriate services for users.51 There are also examples of 
local services having been turned over to faith groups. One of the more controversial 
was Richmond Borough Council's decision in 2011 to transfer a contract for teenage 
counseling from a secular group to the Catholic Children’s Society. This raised 
particular concerns about a religious ethos in service delivery.52  
 
III. Faith Based Services and the Public Sphere 
                                                 
51
  London Borough of Lambeth, Community Plan 2013-2016 available at 
www.lambeth.gov.uk/sites/default/files/ec-community-plan-2013-16.pdf (accessed 20 August 2014). 
52
  British Humanist Association, ‘Concerns raised about faith-based public services’ (30 August 
2012) available at https://humanism.org.uk/2012/08/30/news-1103/ (accessed 20 August 2014). 
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The legal implications of the new politics of service delivery is well illustrated by the 
clash between faith based provision and the principle of non-discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation: Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v The Charity 
Commission for England and Wales.53 The Catholic Care case in some respects may 
be unique to its facts, but it nevertheless raises important questions for the Big 
Society.  
 The starting point is the law of charities and its intersection with equality law. 
Charities must comply with the ‘public benefit’ test, which has been given a statutory 
footing in the Charities Act 2011. The common law presumption that a charitable trust 
for the advancement of religion is for the public benefit has been displaced by a 
statutory list of charitable purposes, which includes ‘the advancement of religion’, but 
not a presumption.54 Discrimination between potential beneficiaries has never 
precluded a finding of public benefit when a charity is for the advancement of 
                                                 
53
  [2010] EWHC 520 (Ch); affd [2011] UKFTT B1 (GRC); affd [2012] UKUT 395 (TCC). The 
procedural history of this case is complex. It includes an earlier decision of the Charities Commission 
and successful appeal by Catholic Care to the High Court: Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v The 
Charity Commission for England and Wales [2010] EWHC 520 (Ch).  
54
  Debra Morris, ‘Charities and the Modern Equality Framework – Heading for a Collision?’ 
(2012) 65 Current Legal Problems 295, 298. 
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religion. To suggest otherwise could undermine the object of the charity, which may 
be to benefit a particular faith community.55  
A more difficult scenario is where the beneficiaries are restricted in a manner 
that appears unrelated to the objects of the charity. The situations in which this arises 
may be quite benign or, as in an infamous case, a direct product of racial or religious 
discrimination.56 While courts across common law jurisdictions have employed 
various devices to eliminate unacceptable forms of beneficiary discrimination (such as 
cy-pres doctrine, finding a ‘public policy’ against discrimination, or the very specific 
statutory provision of the Race Relations Act 1976) it has never been held to negate 
an original finding of public benefit.57  
 This question may well have been superseded by the application of the 
Equality Act 2010. The Act includes a specific ‘charities exception’ in s 193, which 
governs the circumstances under which charities can ‘discriminate’ in terms of 
beneficiaries. Pursuant to ss 1, the restriction of benefits to persons who share a 
‘protected characteristic’ is allowed provided that (a) ‘the person acts in pursuance of 
a charitable instrument’ and also, under (b), that the provision of benefits complies 
                                                 
55
  Ibid., 302. 
56
  See eg Re Dominion Students' Hall Trust [1947] 1 Ch 183. 
57
  Morris (n.54), 305-306. 
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with subsection 2. That subsection states that the provision of such restricted 
beneficiaries must be either (a) ‘a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’ 
or (b) ‘for the purpose of preventing or compensating for a disadvantage linked to the 
protected characteristic’. Although it may be theoretically possible to imagine 
circumstances in which the application of the public benefit test and the s 193 analysis 
lead to different outcomes, in practice the two inquiries will almost certainly reach the 
same result.58 In any event, it suggests an approach through which the tenets of 
charities law and the well established principle of proportionality in equalities law are 
assimilated. It also underscores that beneficiary discrimination does not disappear 
simply because of the requirements of anti-discrimination law.  
 This is illustrated by Catholic Care, which directly raises the conflict between 
adherence to faith and non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.59 This 
high profile controversy concerned a charitable company which provided adoption 
services funded by both local authorities and charitable giving raised by the Roman 
Catholic Church. Pursuant to the Equality Act 2010—which had provided a period of 
transition for agencies in this position—the provision of adoption services could no 
longer be restricted to heterosexual married couples. That restriction constitutes 
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discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. This would force Catholic Care to 
stop providing adoption services since, according to it, to do so would run counter to 
the tenets of the Church. The consequence, according to Catholic Care, would be the 
loss of a valuable service which provided adoption services for particularly hard to 
place children.60  
In order to avoid this impact, Catholic Care sought to rely upon the charities 
exception. To repeat, this requires, first, that the action in question is taken pursuant to 
the charitable instrument. On these facts, this was the adoption agency’s 
memorandum of association. It did not contain provisions which could be relied upon 
to limit services on the basis of sexual orientation. Therefore, Catholic Care sought to 
revise its objects clause to include provisions which made explicit that (amongst other 
things), ‘the Charity shall only provide adoption services to heterosexuals and such 
services to heterosexuals will only be provided in accordance with the tenets of the 
Church’.61  
The amendment of the objects clause of a charity requires the consent of the 
Charity Commission. The Commission refused its consent, holding that objective 
justification under the charities exception was lacking. An appeal to the First Tier 
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Tribunal (FTT) was dismissed. A further appeal to the Upper Tribunal (Tax and 
Chancery) was dismissed. For my purposes, the reasons of Sales J in the Upper 
Tribunal provide a valuable illumination of the issues central to this article.62   
 Sales J held that, in interpreting s 193, Article 14 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights provided a ‘powerful analogy’.63 That analysis begins with the 
question whether there is a legitimate aim; if so, whether it could be achieved by the 
method proposed; and, finally, ‘whether the discrimination on ground of sexual 
orientation proposed by the Charity would constitute a proportionate means of 
achieving’ it.64 Sales J dismissed the appeal largely because he found no compelling 
evidence of a ‘realistic prospect of increasing adoption placements if the Charity were 
permitted to do as it wished’.65 However, his reasoning also suggests that a 
proportionality analysis will not necessarily prevent faith groups from acting in a 
discriminatory fashion.  
 In the judgment, Sales J first held that availability of other services open to the 
individual could not in itself justify discrimination. Nevertheless, he also recognized 
that ‘if the Charity could establish that by discriminating against homosexuals it could 
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materially help children in need of adoption (as it sought to argue), I think it would be 
relevant to the question whether that discrimination was justified that homosexuals 
would have adoption services readily available to them from other sources, since that 
would tend to reduce the detrimental impact on them flowing from such 
discrimination as compared to a situation in which they might be cut out from 
receiving adoption services altogether’.66  
 Second, Sales J held that ‘prejudices about or negative attitudes towards 
homosexuals’, could be relevant to the proportionality analysis if ‘some real detriment 
to the general public interest (of sufficient weight) might arise unless a practice 
discriminating against them were adopted’.67 For example, if it could be demonstrated 
that donors to a charity would be deterred from making donations, which in turn could 
be shown to undermine successful adoptions, that could be material.68 This would not 
be an inappropriate legal recognition of prejudice contrary to public policy: ‘donors 
motivated by respect for Catholic doctrine to have a preference to support adoption 
within a traditional family structure cannot be equated with racist bigots … Such 
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views have a legitimate place in a pluralist, tolerant and broadminded society’.69 
Nevertheless, Sales J added the caveat that ‘convincing and weighty reasons’ would 
be required.70 On these facts, Catholic Care failed to establish that there was a 
‘material probability’ that adoptions would be increased by its work.71 But the 
determination of objective justification might have been different had Catholic Care 
shown that it was ‘likely that its adoption service would remain closed (or even that 
there is a real possibility of that happening)’.72   
 Finally, the fact that same sex couples would have access to other adoption 
services, while it would reduce the detrimental impact upon them, ‘did not remove the 
harm that would be caused to them through feeling that discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation was practised at some point in the adoption system nor would it 
remove the harm to the general social value of promotion of equality of treatment’.73 
Once again, this finding highlighted the need for ‘weighty and convincing reasons’ in 
order to provide the objective justification for discrimination, which had not been 
established.74 Nevertheless, Sales J reiterated that ‘a desire to promote traditional 
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family life is a legitimate point of view in a pluralist democratic society’ which 
deserved respect.75  
 I would argue that Sales J's reasons are ambiguous in terms of the delivery of 
services by faith communities. On the one hand, he upheld the determination of the 
Charity Commission that an amendment to the objects of the charity, which would 
lead to discrimination based on sexual orientation, should not be granted. Catholic 
Care failed to satisfy the ‘weighty’ burden of demonstrating that this was a 
proportionate measure to achieve what was recognized as a legitimate charitable aim.  
But the failure to satisfy that burden was significantly determined by the 
particular facts, in terms of the way in which adoption provision is organized locally 
through voluntary agencies. An agency is paid an ‘inter-agency fee’ of about £24,000 
for a placement and it was found by the FTT that there was ‘a surplus of potential 
adoptive parents on the books of voluntary adoption agencies, because local 
authorities did not seek to tap into and use their full capacity’.76 Thus, the argument 
that the withdrawal of Catholic Care from adoption activity would undermine the aim 
of placing children was factually unsustainable. However, Sales J noted that the inter-
agency fee did not fully cover the costs of Catholic Care in arranging an adoption, 
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‘and therefore would have to be supplemented at the rate of about £13,000 per 
placement by charitable fundraising by the Charity relying on its links with the 
Roman Catholic Church’.77  
The fact that local authority funding does not cover the cost of the voluntary 
sector provider is far from unique to this case. This can create its own difficulties in 
terms of charities law for trustees. For my purposes, it highlights how donors’ desire 
to support ‘traditional family life’ could provide support for a policy of discrimination 
in service provision pursuant to s 193 (and Article 14). The failure to discriminate 
would lead to a diminution in charitable giving and undermine the service. Thus, I 
submit that, as a result of Catholic Care, the door is not firmly closed to upholding 
discrimination based on sexual orientation for services provided by the faith based 
charitable sector. Of particular relevance likely will be whether lesbians and gay men 
had access to alternative providers. The discriminatory mindset of the donors—at 
least in the case sexual orientation—is a legitimate factor to be considered when 
determining justification.  
On the other hand, Catholic Care could be read as unique to its facts, and 
discrimination was found to be disproportionate. Moreover, Sales J emphasized the 
                                                 
77
  Catholic Care (2012, n.53), [16]. 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
need for ‘particularly convincing and weighty reasons’78 and that this was a ‘heavy 
onus’.79 Furthermore, the failure to satisfy the proportionality test presumably would 
mean that the charity would find it difficult to satisfy the ‘public benefit’ requirement. 
However, Sales J also made clear that tests which require a charity to show that 
voluntary income ‘would inevitably be lost’ and that termination of the service ‘was 
the inevitable consequence’ would be too strict.80 Instead, ‘it would ... be relevant if 
the Charity could show that it is likely that its adoption service would remain closed 
(or even that there is a real possibility of that happening), with it being recognised that 
the greater the probability that that might happen the stronger the Charity’s case on 
objective justification might become’.81 
 
 It could be argued that the Catholic Care problem is not one that should arise 
in practice in the provision of services on behalf of the state (in particular, local 
authorities) by faith communities or other bodies. Although a charity may not be 
subject to the duty on a ‘public authority’ under the Human Rights Act,82 the Charity 
Commission most definitely is bound by the Act. Therefore, its determination of 
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charitable status will need to be HRA compliant. That could be of particular 
importance with respect to charities established with the primary object of service 
delivery.83 Second, The Compact between Government and civil society organizations 
outlines undertakings to which both have agreed in relation to the promotion of a fair 
and equal society.84 Government promises to ‘to take practical action to eliminate 
unlawful discrimination, advance equality and to ensure a voice for under-represented 
and disadvantaged groups’.85 Moreover, it acknowledges ‘that organisations 
representing specific disadvantaged or under-represented group(s) can help promote 
social and community cohesion and should have equal access to state funding’.86 In 
the case of a faith community delivering services, it is not difficult to imagine 
situations in which a service aimed at a particular historically disadvantaged group 
could result in the exclusion (whether explicit or because its ethos makes potential 
users uncomfortable) of members of other historically disadvantaged groups. Adding 
to the complexity would be the experience of those who identify across historically 
disadvantaged groups, who could find that their service needs were unmet.  
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 The Compact contains further undertakings by civil society organizations: ‘if 
receiving funding from a government body, show how the value of the work can help 
that body deliver its public sector duties on promoting equality and tackling 
discrimination’,87 and ‘take practical action, such as through funding bids, to 
eliminate unlawful discrimination, advance equality of opportunity and build stronger 
communities’.88 Here again, these aims may suggest that service delivery needs to be 
genuinely open to all potential users. But they could equally be understood as 
ushering in a funding environment in which services are fragmented and targeted at 
particular communities of disadvantage, leading to concerns of balkanization.89  
 The Compact makes reference to the Public Sector Equality Duty, which 
arguably provides the strongest protection against discrimination in service provision. 
The duty requires public bodies to have due regard to the need to eliminate 
discrimination, advance equality of opportunity, and foster good relations between 
different people when carrying out their activities. It is debateable whether the duty 
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applies directly to charities carrying out a contract to deliver public services.90 
However, it does apply to the decision by Government—central or local—to 
subcontract.91 Debra Morris argues that the implications are highly significant. In her 
view, the duty requires that the public body ensures that the contracted out service 
does not involve unlawful discrimination and that public money ‘is used to promote 
equality of opportunity and good relations’.92 In fact, there is concern about the Public 
Sector Equality Duty and its potential impact upon faith communities from amongst 
those who defend religious freedom.93 
 
 In the wake of Catholic Care, it is not entirely clear when discrimination is 
unlawful. Moreover, the promotion of good community relations is capable of 
competing interpretations. For example, Lucy Vickers suggests that, with the 
extension of the public sector duty to religion and belief under the Equality Act 2010, 
public authorities might prioritize the needs of faith based communities, which could 
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have unintended consequences for the advancement of the principles of equality.94 It 
has been argued that ‘authorities may feel under pressure to contract with religious 
groups in preference to inclusive secular groups if they exercise their new “right to 
bid”, in a mistaken attempt to meet the “needs” of faith groups’.95 Government has 
made clear that delivery of public services by faith communities cannot be limited to 
members of that group or to those of faith generally.96 This is a different scenario 
from faith based provision of social services financially supported by the state (such 
as care homes for the elderly). These services often are restricted to community 
members and might not be welcoming to same-sex couples.  
 Even less clear is the extent to which faith based, publically funded services 
can retain a distinctive faith based ethos. On the one hand, some argue that the ethos 
of faith can be a unique strength and one of the reasons behind creating diversity of 
provision.97 The difficulty arises when faith manifests itself in ways which could be 
exclusionary. This is a variation of the problem of private and public—belief and 
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action—which has proven troubling for law to accommodate in other contexts 
involving people of faith in the public sphere.98 On this point, once again, supporters 
of the Big Society argue that faith can provide a much needed challenge to existing 
delivery models, leading to innovation and improved outcomes.99  
However, the significance of a faith based ethos can be overstated. Research 
suggests that, in the case of faith organizations, ‘it seems that some of the larger 
public sector deliverers have professionalised themselves into separate space’,100 
making them quite different bodies from the faith groups from which they emanated. 
In terms of professional culture, they may find themselves far closer to the public 
sector which previously delivered the service. This raises the question as to whether 
the claimed benefits of contracting out of service delivery will materialize.101   
 In fact, faith based providers argue that they must 'secularize' (or, perhaps 
more accurately, de-Christianize) in order to obtain and manage public sector 
contracts.102 This is necessary in order to overcome prejudice against them on the part 
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of local authorities, stemming from the fear of proselytism and lack of inclusivity.103 
Sarah Johnson has investigated this phenomenon in the context of services for 
homeless people.104 She concludes that in many cases there has been a disassociation 
of service provision from faith. Moreover, the extent of the association to a faith 
group at times may be strategically determined: '[a] small proportion remain strongly 
linked with a faith community. … Others, however, are now faith-based “in name 
only”, with their faith origins barely evident in palimpsest. A number of former FBOs 
now self-identify as “secular” and are publicly rebranding (by removing religious 
referents from their title and mission statement, for example) to disassociate 
themselves from formalized religion. … It is very common for FBOs, together with 
some secular projects that grew out of faith initiatives, to emphasize or de-emphasize 
their project’s faith affiliation or history according to their audience: “playing it up” 
when seeking support from faith communities and “playing it down” when applying 
for public funding'.105 Johnson also found that, in many cases, it is difficult for the 
service user to actually determine whether a provider is faith based: ‘only a very small 
minority of service users reported that they had ever been subjected to unwelcome 
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proselytism (“bible bashing”) by a faith-based service, and then never in a publicly 
funded project’.106 
 
 This observation raises a number of concerns. While it is reassuring that 
service users only infrequently reported ‘bible bashing’ (although ‘never’ would be 
more conclusive), there may be indirect ways of transmitting faith. The British 
Humanist Association, for example, has focused upon the transfer of the contract for 
teenage counseling to the Catholic Children’s Society by the Richmond Borough 
Council. It expresses concerns ‘at this organisation’s ability to provide information on 
contraception and unwanted pregnancies, and to meet the needs of clients suffering 
from homophobic bullying’.107 This is the problem of the compatibility of religious 
doctrine with the full range of social problems and potential solutions.  
Faith may also provide a particular interpretation of the desirable solutions to 
personal challenges which are rooted in personal transformation rather than in social 
structures. As I will argue in the next section, this is an issue in the American 
evangelical context, in which it is difficult to divorce some faith based services from 
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the antidote of accepting Jesus Christ as personal saviour.108 This provides an extreme 
example of the difficulty of distinguishing public and private in service provision, 
although it seems not to be a significant feature in England. In fact, Johnson’s 
research suggests, perhaps surprisingly to some, that ‘FBOs typically eschew coercive 
or enforcement approaches, while secular agencies tend to be more sympathetic 
towards the “rehabilitative” measure promoted by central government’.109 
 
 A closely related concern is the extent to which state funded service provision 
by faith based providers can be separated from their other activities. Is it realistic to 
expect that the former can be secularized while the latter is explicitly religious? 
Although this may be a difficult exercise in line drawing, it is essential in order to 
maintain services that are truly public. Otherwise, ‘a moral claim that conflicts with 
an essential public value’ could be attributed to the state.110 Examples can be devised 
in order to illuminate this problem: ‘the Salvation Army’s theological views, which 
includes a belief that homosexuality is immoral, should not categorically preclude its 
affiliated social service agencies from receiving government funds. However, if the 
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Salvation Army were to operate an AIDS hospice in which residents were asked to 
repent from any homosexual conduct as part of making peace with God, the 
government would not be overreaching morally to deny funding to such a 
programme’.111 
 
 While such a demarcation is easy in theory, it may prove far more difficult in 
practice. On the one hand, we might ask whether the service user realistically can, or 
should be expected to, engage in a line drawing exercise. That is, unless the faith 
community ‘rebrands’ a service such that it is completely devoid of associations with 
faith, it may be unfair to expect the nonbelieving user to partake. 
 On the other hand, is it appropriate to expect this strict demarcation from faith 
communities? The Government’s position is that proselytization is unacceptable but 
that ‘it’s perfectly reasonable for faith groups to be open about their religious 
motivation, or explain more about their faith to those who ask’.112 Given that the Big 
Society presupposes that people of faith possess particularly well developed skills of 
active citizenship, it becomes difficult to then demand that those attributes are 
‘closeted’ when delivering services. But faith communities do have a genuine choice 
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as to whether to pursue service delivery contracts and, once they do so, they ‘make 
themselves accountable to the collective norms pursued by the state, rather than the 
conscience-driven norms of their constituents’.113 In response, however, we need to 
recall that the Big Society is founded on the value of pluralism, and questions the 
wisdom of a single set of norms propagated by the state.  
For some faith based charities, there is justifiable scepticism as to their Big 
Society role. Having been lauded for their unique capacity to deliver services (and the 
Government’s agenda), they then may be required to eschew (in the public sphere) the 
very ethos which was supposed to make them valuable. There are also concerns 
regarding the capacity of faith groups to deliver; the extent to which public funding 
may hinder their ability to criticize government and to engage in advocacy; the need 
for professionalization and bureaucratization which can undermine a culture of 
volunteerism; and the creation of a culture of dependency on government contracts 
leading to mission drift (which may not even represent the full economic cost).114 
These are strong countervailing factors which may prompt many faith groups to avoid 
public service delivery. 
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IV.  Disentangling Choice: The Citizen as Consumer  
In this section, I turn to the American experience of faith communities and public 
services. Although the specificity of the US Constitutional context must be 
acknowledged, recent American history provides valuable comparative insights. As 
has often been noted, the United States is paradoxical when it comes to faith. It is a 
highly religious society in which religion routinely enters the public sphere. But the 
constitutional separation of church and state has textured the ways in which faith 
traverses the public/private dichotomy. For example, there is a long tradition of the 
provision of services by faith groups. However, support for those services from state 
actors was constrained by the constitutional requirement for state neutrality in relation 
to religion.115 
 
 The extent to which the state can place burdens on the free exercise of religion 
consistently with the Establishment Clause was most famously articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Sherbert v Verner.116 The Sherbert doctrine was significantly 
narrowed by the Court in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of 
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Oregon v Smith.117 The majority upheld ‘neutral laws of general applicability’ which 
had an incidental impact on religion, even in the absence of a compelling state 
justification. The political fallout from Smith led to the enactment of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, which restored the Sherbert standard with respect to federal 
law. The attempt at raising the standard with respect to state law was found to be 
unconstitutional. As a consequence of Smith, state anti-discrimination laws of general 
application which prohibit sexual orientation discrimination may prove more difficult 
to challenge as a violation of the free exercise of religion in terms of their impact 
upon faith based social service agencies. This issue arose in Massachusetts, where 
Catholic Charities was providing adoption services.118 In that particular case, it has 
been argued that ‘if Catholic Charities were to be given a statutory exception to the 
anti-discrimination statute, it is likely that the Massachusetts courts would find such 
an exception to be a violation of the equal protection conferred by the Massachusetts 
State Constitution’.119  
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Limitations on religious freedom also have been upheld with respect to the 
ability of the state to determine charitable status and thereby preclude the claiming of 
tax exempt status for organizations which violate ‘public policy’. In Bob Jones 
University v United States,120 the Supreme Court famously upheld the determination 
by the Internal Revenue Service that Bob Jones University—a faith based 
institution—be denied charitable status. Its (faith based) rule against interracial dating 
on campus was found to be contrary to a fundamental public policy against racial 
discrimination firmly embedded in the nation’s history. Similarly, in Christian Legal 
Society v Martinez,121 the Supreme Court upheld a public university’s choice not to 
exempt a Christian student group from the university’s antidiscrimination policy. This 
has been interpreted as a ‘subsidy case’ in which the state may choose to ‘decline to 
support the disfavoured conduct’ without contravening the right to free exercise of 
religion.122 Linda McClain interprets these cases as upholding an overriding unitary 
(rather than pluralistic) conception of the public interest, particularly when it touches 
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upon equality.123 It is the same tension which underscores the problematic relationship 
between equality and diversity in the Big Society.  
 While American constitutional interpretation has relaxed the extent to which 
the state is prevented from burdening the free exercise of religion, political 
developments have expanded the role of faith communities in the delivery of services. 
On this point, constitutional interpretation has proven to be permissive regarding the 
ability of the state to devolve service provision to religious groups without running 
afoul of the Constitution.  
 These developments form part of a historical trajectory in which the 
traditionally important role of churches in the provision of charity was displaced by 
government beginning in the 1940s. Parallel processes of ‘regulation and 
professionalisation’ had the combined effect of marginalizing non-governmental 
providers in ways similar to what occured in the United Kingdom with the growth of 
the welfare state.124 At the same time, the tradition of state support for private 
provision is evidenced by the Hill-Burton Act which, in 1946, provided public 
funding for private hospitals ‘if they met conditions for public service, such as 
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maintaining emergency rooms in which anyone could be treated’.125 By the 1960s, 
those services which continued to be provided by faith communities largely had 
rebranded themselves as ‘faith-affiliated’, so as to ensure that any connection to their 
religious roots was not apparent to users.126 The motivation was the continued receipt 
of public funding while ‘relying on cheaper paraprofessional bureaucracies to deliver 
services’.127  
The model of federal welfare delivery most associated with the Great Society 
of the Johnson administration saw its demise through a series of ideological 
developments in subsequent decades. The New Federalism agenda emerged under 
Nixon, with ‘a plan to send federal tax revenue back to the states so states would have 
more discretionary money to address social concerns’.128 This change was partnered 
with the ‘devolution of service responsibility’ under Reagan, under which a range of 
providers—both profit and not for profit—were encouraged to participate.129 With 
                                                 
125
  Stephen Edward McMillan, ‘Faith-Based Social Services: From Communitarianism to 
Individualistic Values’ (2011) 46 Zygon 482, 485. 
126
  Dinham (n.2), 155.  
127
  McMillan (n.125), 486. 
128
  Wineburg, Coleman, Boddie and Cnaan (n.108), 19. 
129
  Ibid. 
44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
time, this led to ‘government by proxy’, in which the state, rather than being the 
provider of services, became the purchaser from a range of sources.130  
Despite the different political orientation, the Clinton administration advanced 
the same agenda with the welfare reform legislation of 1996. Famously, at this point 
the entitlement principle was broken and programme design was devolved to states 
and localities.131 Less well known is the fact that, during Clinton’s presidency, 
Charitable Choice legislation was enacted. This law removed barriers to the provision 
of social services by explicitly faith based organizations as part of a devolutionary 
approach to government. Previously, it was assumed that public funding for faith 
based initiatives required that the religious character of the organization be ‘closeted’, 
so that it resembled a non-faith based provider: 'the prevailing normative conditions 
for contracting with the government were that a faith-based organisation had to 
suppress its religious character by removing all religious symbols from the room 
where service was provided; foregoing any religious practices or rituals (such as 
prayers at meals), accepting all clients, even those opposed to the beliefs of the 
providers; hiring staff that reflected society at large and not the organization’s spirit 
and belief system; adhering to government contract regulations that restrict the 
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organization’s religious expression; and incorporating separately as a … nonprofit 
organization'.132 
 
 Charitable Choice is closely associated with George W Bush, along with his 
establishment of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. 
By virtue of these developments, the requirement for the closeting of faith was largely 
removed. In addition, organizations can now hire and fire employees based on 
religious beliefs, which has been described as a ‘radical retrenchment of public 
services into the arms of religion’.133  
It is important to recognize that Charitable Choice has been used mostly by 
‘the larger and mostly Christian organisations with the organizational capacity to 
handle reporting and evaluation requirements’ (such as the requirement that public 
money be used solely for the social services under contract and that the cost of 
religious activities must be covered by other sources of funding).134 In this way, an 
attempt is made to maintain the separation of church and state. The result is that 
church affiliated agencies are able to compete in the market for social services ‘from a 
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privileged position’ because of the backing of the church, allowing them to act much 
like subsidiary corporations.135  
Allowing a faith based ethos to permeate the provision of social services not 
surprisingly troubles those who favour the traditional American constitutional 
separation of church and state.136 Charitable Choice comes dangerously close, in this 
view, to an endorsement of religion by the state and it forces faith on citizens 
receiving public services. For supporters of Charitable Choice, these concerns are 
misplaced. They argue that diversity in services will produce better results.137 Choice 
should include explicitly faith based provision which, it is argued, has a track record 
of success, particularly in difficult cases.138 To require that faith is closeted risks 
losing the advantages of that service, rendering it instead a carbon copy of the existing 
(failing) model. Concerns regarding the forcing of faith on service users are invalid, 
provided that a diversity of services is available from which the citizen is able to 
exercise genuine choice. In this way, a model of citizenship is grounded in consumer 
choice rather than in the shared experience of universal service delivery. 
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But if we take the claimed ability of faith groups to solve social problems 
seriously, we must answer more challenging questions about their appropriate role in 
service delivery. What makes their methods successful? For some, the ability of faith 
to solve problems is centred on the power of accepting Jesus Christ as personal 
saviour. But this antidote inevitably has the consequence that social problems become 
individualized and resolvable primarily through the very personal act of religious 
rebirth.139 It also suggests, if true, that to require the closeting of faith definitely will 
undermine the efficacy of the service. Most importantly, it should make us sceptical 
as to whether faith based services realistically can be made to appear secular.140  
This also raises the issue whether the state should be supporting personal 
religious conversion and the atonement of sin, especially in a society in which 
religious freedom and anti-establishment are constitutionally fundamental.141 It is 
hardly surprising that ‘faith-intensive social services’ were strongly endorsed by 
George W Bush, given the support which he himself famously received from the 
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power of personal faith to treat his alcoholism.142 
 
 The constitutionality of faith based initiatives began to be clarified by the 
Supreme Court's decision in Bowen v Kendrick,143 the case which opened the door to 
Charitable Choice. At issue was the constitutionality of the Adolescent Family Life 
Act, which made government grants available to non-profit organizations—including 
faith communities—for teenage sex education. The Court ruled that so long as grants 
were not aimed at ‘pervasively sectarian’ groups, government funding of religious 
organizations was permissible in order to combat social problems.144  
 The law was further clarified by the Supreme Court in Zelman v Simmons-
Harris,145 which concerned a controversial programme to combat the allegedly poor 
performance of the public school system in Cleveland, Ohio. A Federal District Court 
order had placed the Cleveland School District under the control of the state 
legislature because of a ‘crisis of magnitude’ around educational standards.146 
Amongst the initiatives that the state legislature enacted was the Pilot Project 
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Scholarship Program. This provided students with financial assistance through the 
provision of vouchers ‘to attend a participating public or private school of their 
parent’s choosing and tutorial aid for students who chose to remain enrolled in public 
school’.147 Private schools were required under the program ‘not to discriminate on 
the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background, or to “advocate or foster unlawful 
behavior or to teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, 
national origin, or religion”'.148 The vast majority of vouchers were directed by 
parents to religious schools, leading to the constitutional question whether the 
program violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  
Five members of the Supreme Court upheld the voucher scheme. Writing for 
the narrow majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the program had a ‘valid 
secular purpose of providing educational assistance to poor children in a 
demonstrably failing public school system’, and the constitutional issue was whether 
the program ‘has the forbidden “effect” of advancing or inhibiting religion’.149 Crucial 
to the holding that there was no unlawful effect was the fact that 'government aid 
reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of 
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private individuals’.150 Although the majority of participating private schools had a 
religious character, this did not undermine the genuine choice which had been granted 
to parents. For the majority, it is choice which provides the necessary buffer between 
church and state. 
By contrast, the dissenting judgment of Justice Souter interpreted choice in a 
more nuanced manner. He found it particularly significant that ‘96.6% of all voucher 
recipients go to religious schools’, suggesting that the only realistic alternative to the 
public school system was faith based.151 If ‘the criterion is one of genuinely free 
choice on the parts of the private individuals who choose’, then this program failed, 
even without an intent on the part of the state to channel public money into religious 
schools.152 Moreover, the dissent expressed broader concerns about programs that 
provide indirect aid to religion. Justice Souter highlighted the dangers of reliance on 
state funds and the potential for ‘friction’ between religious communities in 
competition for funding; and the potential disenchantment of ‘taxpayers who take 
their liberty of conscience seriously’.153  
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In a separate dissenting judgment, Justice Breyer focused upon the importance 
of primary school education and its potential as a site for religious indoctrination. He 
concluded that this program could lead to ‘social division’, and he explicitly 
mentioned the status of religious minorities as well as those opposed to religious 
education.154 For Justice Breyer, this ‘entanglement’ undermined the important role of 
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment in protecting against ‘religious strife’.155 
He contrasted the American separation of church and state in the context of public 
education with the willingness of other countries, such as the United Kingdom, to 
provide state funding for religious schools. Justice Breyer’s analysis adopts an 
understanding of citizenship that depends upon a shared, unitary, neo-republican, 
quintessentially American space of public education. Moreover, the valuable 
autonomy of the ‘partial publics’ that are faith communities are best protected by 
remaining free of the constraints which will result from dependency on the state.156 
 
 In sum, the boundary between church and state in the context of public 
services in the United States has become increasingly blurred. The model of social 
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citizenship associated with the Great Society of the 1960s has been fragmented by the 
politics of the New Federalism; the ideological repudiation of welfare entitlement; 
and the promotion of diversity in service provision including by faith communities. 
These important political developments have been supported to some degree by 
judicial interpretation of the Religion Clauses, with a focus on consumer choice as the 
key determinant of the legality of state funding. Furthermore, as evidenced by the 
majority in Zelman, choice has been understood formalistically. By viewing the 
citizen as the intermediary and characterizing her position in terms of a choice as to 
how to spend her vouchers, the consumer becomes the constitutional buffer. This 
enables faith communities to legally participate in public service provision and to 
maintain a faith based ethos while doing so. Of course, the point at which the nexus 
between government and faith becomes too direct and unmediated remains to be 
resolved in individual cases.157 It should come as no surprise that these developments 
continue to give rise to both debate and litigation. 
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V. Privatization, Public Values and the Politics of Pluralism 
The American experience of faith based social services provides a valuable study. 
Although the limits of comparative analysis, particularly with respect to constitutional 
issues, need to be kept firmly in mind, the insights are wide ranging and touch upon 
fundamental questions of liberalism, pluralism, and citizenship. 
 For proponents of the current American approach, the relaxation of the 
boundary between church and state is welcomed on the basis of innovation, 
devolution, pluralism, efficiency, and choice. Evidence is amassed to suggest that 
state delivery can only be improved by welcoming diverse new actors into the sector 
including faith based participants with their proven track record. This is a model 
characterized by partnerships and participation. The citizen not only makes choices as 
to service provider. As an active consumer, she also practices citizenship through 
participation in delivery. Rather than a single public sphere in which the citizen 
receives services from the state, we should conceive of multiple public spheres which 
will enhance social cohesion. With proper oversight and conditions, the citizen can be 
assured that standards will be maintained while choice and participation will be 
enhanced.  
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 For opponents, the benefits of privatization are disputed. First, arguments 
regarding service quality and innovation are challenged on empirical grounds.158 To 
what extent, it is asked, can the benefits that are attributed to small scale, civil society 
organizations be maintained when the state contracts with private agencies? In fact, 
large scale, often bureaucratic and professionalized (probably for profit) organizations 
will be the main beneficiaries.159 Rather than fostering innovation, these agencies may 
face the same difficulties that are attributed to the state. As well, to the extent that 
agencies in receipt of state funds are obligated to separate their faith based activities 
from their state funded service provision (and the degree to which that separation is 
enforced may be questionable), the benefits attributed to faith based provision may be 
undermined. Critics also argue that the maintenance of standards (and equality 
between citizens) in a devolved model is more difficult in practice than advocates 
suggest, because service provision becomes fragmented across a wide range of 
providers in the profit and not for profit sectors.160 Rather than providing the utopia of 
choice, the reality may be a patchwork of services in which gaps and unevenness 
increasingly appear. For example, the impact of choice on perceived ‘failing’ schools 
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(and their remaining students) deserves close scrutiny. As a consequence, the citizen 
is at the mercy of chance. More perniciously, choice can depend upon whether the 
citizen's particular circumstances present challenges which are not appealing (or cost 
effective) to providers.  
 The critique of faith based services extends beyond the empirical to the 
normative. For critics, a pluralistic model of services contains within it the seeds of 
social division and exclusion. Consumer choice is at the price of a unitary sphere of 
shared citizenship based on public services. That public sphere is inevitably 
undermined by programs such as Charitable Choice, leaving social citizenship 
compromised. The state, in this narrative, becomes an ‘amoral shell’ and the idea of a 
shared experience of 'belonging' is a fiction.161 In response, however, it is claimed that 
mechanisms can be devised by which ‘public values’, such as equality, can be 
enshrined within a devolved model of service delivery. This might include agreed 
minimum standards and a common ethos of service. In other words, pluralism does 
not necessarily require the abandonment of commonality, and the state has a crucial 
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role in ensuring both genuine choice and the protection of core ‘public values’.162 
 
 This position has been vigorously advocated by Martha Minow, who favours 
what she calls ‘nontoxic pluralism’ which ‘can encourage virtues of participation, 
self-governance, mutual aid, and care for others, while allowing freedom from the 
controlling force of a powerful government’.163 Nontoxicity, she argues, requires that 
groups must be willing to support those ‘public norms’ and values which we identify 
with the public sphere, including non-discrimination and the opportunity for group 
members to embrace multiple identities and to exit the group.164 These are the 
characteristics which make a group nontoxic. Thus, it is not just choice that protects 
the citizen but also the requirement to comply with fundamental public values.  
 Critics also argue that the assumption that privatized public services promote 
pluralism and diversity is far from proven. The American experience suggests that 
only a narrow range of organized faith groups have taken advantage of the 
opportunities arising from Charitable Choice, namely, those with the infrastructure 
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and capacity to contract for services in what remains a regulated environment.165 As a 
consequence, rather than generating diversity, Charitable Choice may have reinforced 
the hegemony of Christianity. The result—as predicted by Justice Breyer in Zelman— 
might well be an increase in social division and disharmony in a (not very plural) 
public sphere.  
 Another concern is the danger that essentialized communities and identities 
will be reinforced by faith based provision. Diversity in services is sometimes 
justified in terms of tailoring provision to the particular needs of each social group. 
But this benefit can be disputed to the extent that conceiving of a service as provided 
to a community (rather than to individuals) can reinforce traditional hierarchies and 
power dynamics within those communities.166 That is, existing leaders may be 
unilaterally articulating the needs of the wider group. As a consequence, citizen 
consumers can come to be viewed in terms of stereotypes even from within the 
communities to which they belong. The possibility of multiple identities and complex 
needs can be lost as the citizen is required to fit the particular identity to which service 
is targeted. The complexity of service needs resulting from intersectionality may not 
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be met when the provision of services to well defined groups becomes the basis for 
claiming that equality is advanced. As well, the possibility of 'escape' from 
constricting private communities into an overarching public sphere will be reduced. 
While Minow’s vision of nontoxicity may be laudable, the reality may fall short. 
 Furthermore, proponents and critics disagree about the impact on the faith 
group. For supporters, faith based service provision is constructed as a benign choice 
for groups who can determine whether to pursue contracts (with conditions) and can 
always ‘structure their internal affairs to minimize the conditions' norm-altering 
effects’.167 However, it is debatable whether the choice open to faith groups (like the 
choice open to parents in Zelman) is genuinely unconstrained, or whether financial 
imperatives will dictate whether contracts are pursued.  
 So too, critics ask whether it is realistic to believe that (supposedly public) 
faith based service provision can be separated from the rest of faith based activity. 
This argument is the mirror image of the exposure of the citizen to unwanted religion. 
Here the issue is whether the faith group inevitably will find itself bureaucratized, 
colonized and disciplined by the liberal public values that may come to inform all 
aspects of the faith based organization. In this way, the state will undermine the very 
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pluralism that was being nurtured through the faith based initiative: ‘supporters of 
privatization underestimate the corrosive force of public strings on religious pluralism 
… bleed normative pluralism of its color and vibrancy, undermining the dynamism 
that arises from a mix among diverse modes of being and conceptions of the good’.168 
As a consequence, faith based services may well suffer to the extent that ‘the miracle-
inducing stuff of prayer and worship’ has been cleansed by public values.169 In other 
words, what makes faith based services valuable will be undermined by the very act 
of enfolding it within the state.  
 The impact of colonization of faith by the state can take many forms. Most 
obviously, by ‘choosing’ to engage with service delivery, faith groups report that they 
have lost control of their own agendas. They experience depoliticization as they 
become, not advocates for social change, but efficient providers of services.170 The 
ability to mount political challenges to social inequalities can be undermined by 
reliance upon the state for contracts. Moreover, cooperation with other groups may be 
less likely in a competitive funding environment. The bureaucratic reporting and 
governance requirements of service provision undermine the efficiencies that had 
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previously characterized the sector.171 This is compounded by the need to determine 
whether contracts with the state represent the full economic cost of the service to be 
provided.  
 For my purposes, however, the key issue concerns the imposition of ‘public 
values’ as a condition for the award of contracts. It is here that the potential clash 
between faith and equality seeking groups such as gays and lesbians can be felt. Faith 
groups express concern that the ‘strings attached’ to contracts result in the triumph of 
liberal, secular values.172 This is the homogenizing effect of liberalism of which 
Kathleen Sullivan warns.173 For others, this form of colonization is not a concern and 
should be encouraged. From a liberal standpoint, Stephen Macedo argues that ‘we 
should do what we reasonably can to insure that publicly subsidized civil society 
institutions serve liberal democratic values’174 precisely because faith communities 
‘are not necessarily seedbeds of good citizenship’.175 In terms of public values, 
Macedo highlights ‘popular enlightenment, the capacity for reflective and self-critical 
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deliberation, and broad forms of social cooperation.’176 The colonization of the 
private realm to advance those values, he claims, is not objectionable. The principle of 
non-discrimination would seem to fall squarely within the set. A similar point has 
been made by Jody Freeman, who takes a pragmatic approach to the benefits of 
privatization, while also advocating the potential for a simultaneous process of 
‘publicization’.177 Through this interaction, ‘private actors increasingly commit 
themselves to traditionally public goals as the price of access to lucrative 
opportunities to deliver goods and services that might otherwise be provided directly 
by the state’.178 In this way, privatization can operate in ‘democracy-enhancing 
ways’.179    
While sceptics might question the empirical basis of the benefits of 
publicization—particularly in the United Kingdom—the principle of non-
discrimination in the supply of faith based services might provide one example where 
the phenomenon has considerable traction. What the American experience suggests is 
that it is important for the state to attach public value strings to contracts. In addition, 
the state must ensure that there is genuine choice on the part of the citizen, 
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particularly if there are concerns that public values may not be fully protected. The 
importance of a vibrant public sphere becomes heightened in a context in which social 
citizenship can easily become fragmented or, to use a more loaded term, balkanized. 
 
VI. Concluding Thoughts 
In this article, I have explored a timely and increasingly important issue: the 
implications for liberal values such as equality in a political environment 
characterized by the Big Society and economic austerity. I have turned both to recent 
litigation in England and to comparative American developments in order to more 
fully understand what is at stake. Fundamentally, I have described a tension between 
pluralism and liberalism. But the way in which that tension plays out draws upon a 
range of discourses about the state, citizenship, the value of faith, and the role of the 
public sphere.  
 By way of conclusion, this analysis leads to an indeterminate outcome. While 
I agree that citizens should have genuine concerns about the impact of the Big Society 
agenda with respect to the deployment of faith communities in the delivery of public 
services, the evidence of the marginalization of liberal values is mixed. For example, 
in the realm of education, faith based free schools may be of more immediate concern 
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than social services. In fact, faith communities themselves may have at least as much 
to fear as equality seeking groups. Nevertheless, what is clear is that these issues will 
not disappear.  
 This is an arena in which insights drawn from theory can assist in devising 
public policy. My analysis suggests that, in judging Big Society initiatives, we focus 
on whether there is genuine choice on the part of citizens; whether public values are 
sufficiently protected in the arrangements surrounding service delivery; whether 
assumptions are made regarding services delivered to communities which privilege 
traditional conceptions of the group and erase multiple identities; and whether the 
availability of contracts for service delivery result in increased pluralism (including 
those citizens who are not members of faith communities) or the reinforcement of 
Christian hegemony. 
 Furthermore, we need to carefully test empirical claims regarding innovation, 
efficiency and grassroots delivery. While we can all recognize moments in which the 
state has failed in the delivery of services, we should be under no illusions regarding 
the performance of other sectors. In addition, through its engagement with civil 
society actors, the state may undermine the very advantages that they bring to the 
table, through bureaurcratic requirements, professionalization, and contract 
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compliance. We also need to be wary of exaggerated claims that those of faith 
necessarily make ‘better’ citizens and how this might translate into service delivery. 
For faith communities, they too need to be cautious about their deployment as 
deliverers of services and the impact this may have on their agendas for social change, 
political critique, and activism.  
 Recent history has demonstrated that the role of the state has changed and it is 
probably unrealistic to call for a return to a utopian past (which never actually existed 
in reality). In this article, I have tried to start a process of developing criteria and tests 
by which we might evaluate the current agenda in action. Ultimately, I approach the 
new culture of contracting out to faith communities pragmatically, but with certain 
core values – such as equality and non-discrimination as key components of shared 
citizenship – firmly in view.  
